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1. Introduction 
  
Nash equilibrium theory has become an important branch in game theory (see [1], [12], [19]). 
Together with Pareto equilibrium theory, Nash equilibrium theory has been widely applied to 
many different fields, particularly in economics (see [9], [11], [15], [16], [19]). 
 
In pure and applied mathematics, Nash equilibrium problems have attracted numerous authors to 
study, leading to its generalization and extension to broad fields with many applications (see [5], 
[11], [17]).  
 
Recently, along with the development of split variational inequality theory, many authors have 
been rapidly developing the split equilibrium problem theory (see [2-5], [8-9], [14], [18]). These 
authors studied mathematical optimization problems which are considered to be equilibrium 
problems. To my knowledge, there have been no authors studying split Nash equilibrium 
problems for noncooperative strategic games.       
 
Since the source of Nash equilibrium problems is noncooperative strategic games, we consider 
split Nash equilibrium problems for two related noncooperative strategic games (That is defined 
in section 3). In this paper, we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems 
associated with two noncooperative strategic games with the strategy sets for the players to be 
nonempty closed and convex subsets of Banach spaces. We utilize the Fan-KKM theorem to 
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prove the existence of solutions to some split Nash equilibrium problems of noncooperative 
strategic games.  
 
The results of the split Nash equilibrium problems of noncooperative strategic games can be 
directly applied to the existence of split Nash equilibrium for repeating noncooperative strategic 
games in which the strategies in the repeated games are linearly transformed from the previous 
games.    
 
This paper is organized as follows: for reference, in section 2, we recall some concepts of 
partially ordered topological vector spaces, the concept of KKM mapping and the Fan-KKM 
theorem; in section 3, we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems and the 
concept of convexity direction preserved property for linear operators. Then by applying the Fan-
KKM theorem, we prove an existence theorem of solutions to some split Nash equilibrium 
problems of related noncooperative strategic games. To my knowledge, this is the first time an 
existence theorem for split Nash equilibrium problems has been proven. As application of this 
existence to economics, an example is provided to study the existence of split Nash equilibrium 
of utilities of two related economies. Then, we provide an existence theorem of split Nash 
equilibrium problems for repeated noncooperative strategic games, that can be considered as a 
special case of split Nash equilibrium problems of related noncooperative strategic games. 
Finally, we generalize the Bertrant duopoly model to the extended Bertrant model of price 
competition and consider the Markov split Nash equilibrium problems in the repeated extended 
Bertrant duopoly model.          
 
2.  Preliminaries  
 
2.1. Partially ordered topological vector spaces  
 
Suppose that a topological vector space U is equipped with a partial order  which has the 
following properties:  
 
1. w  u implies w + z  u + z, for all u, w, z  U; 
2. w  u implies w  u, for u, w  U and   0; 
3. For any u  U, the following sets are closed  
 
                 [u) = {w  U: w  u} and (u] = {w  U: u  w}. 
 
Then, in this paper, U is called a partially ordered topological vector space, or is simply called an 
ordered topological vector space, which is written as (U, ). The above Condition 3 of partially 
ordered topological vector spaces is the definition that the topology of U is natural with respect to 
the partial order  on U. 
 
2.2. Fan-KKM Theorem 
 
Fan-KKM theorem is applied in the proof of the main theorem in this section. For more details 
regarding to KKM mappings and Fan-KKM theorem, please refer to Fan [6] and Park [13]. For 
easy reference, we briefly recall the definition of KKM mappings and Fan-KKM theorem below.   
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Let K be a nonempty subset of a linear space B. A set-valued mapping T: K→2B\{} is said to be 
a KKM mapping if for any finite subset{y1, y2, . . . ,yn} of K, we have 
 
                                                     co{y1, y2, . . . ,yn}  1inT(yi), 
 
where co{y1, y2, . . . ,yn} denotes the convex hull of {y1, y2, . . . ,yn}. 
 
Fan-KKM Theorem. Let K be a nonempty closed convex subset of a Hausdorff topological 
vector space B and let T: K →2B\{} be a KKM mapping with closed values. If there exists a 
point y0 ∈ K such that T(y0) is a compact subset, then 
 
                                                                 yK T(y)  . 
 
3. Split Nash equilibrium problems in related noncooperative strategic games 
 
3.1. Noncooperative strategic games  
 
We first recall some concepts of noncooperative strategic games. For the details see [12] and 
[19]. Let n be a positive integer greater than 1. An n-person noncooperative strategic game 
consists of the following elements: 
 
1. the set of n players denoted by N with N = n; 
2. the set of profiles SN = iN Si, where Si is the pure strategy set for player i  N; 
3. the utility (payoff) function fi for i  N, which is a real function defined on SN.  
 
This game is denoted by G(N, SN, f), where f  = iN fi, that is a mapping from SN to Rn. As usual, 
for every i  N, we often denote a profile of pure strategies for player i’s opponents by 
 
                                                  xi = (x1, x2, …, xi 1, xi +1, xn). 
 
We similarly denote the set of profiles of pure strategies for player i’s opponents by 
 
                                                             Si = kN\{i} Sk.  
 
Throughout this section, unless otherwise is stated, we assume that, in the products iN Si, iN 
fi and kN\{i} Sk, the players appear in the same sequential orders. Then we write x  SN as  
 
                                                x = (xi, xi) with xi   Si, for i  N.                                            (1) 
 
Moreover, for every xi   Si, we denote  
 
                                                     fi(Si, xi) = {fi(zi, xi): zi  Si}. 
 
From f = iN fi in game G(N, SN, f), for any x  S, we have 
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                                                                f(x) = iN fi(x).                                                           
 
For a given f = iN fi, we conveniently define a mapping F: SNSN  Rn by 
 
                                              F(z, x) = iN fi(zi, xi), for any x, z  SN.                          
 
If x = z, then 
 
                                                             F(z, x) = F(x, x) = f(x).                                                  
 
Let n be the component-wise ordering on Rn. It is clear to see that n is a partial order on Rn. It 
follows that, for x, z  SN, 
 
                               F(z, x) n f(x)  if and only if   fi(zi, xi)  fi(xi, xi), for all i  N.   
 
In an n-person non-cooperative strategic game G(N, SN, f), a profile x
 SN is called a Nash 
equilibrium of this game if the following inequality holds: 
 
                                                            F(z, x

) n f( x ), for all z  SN. 
 
It is equivalent to 
 
                                       fi(zi, ix

)  fi( ix

, ix

),  for every i  N and for every zi  Si.                                                                                                            
 
In an n-person non-cooperative strategic game G(N, SN, f), for every i  N, we define a set-
valued mapping i: Si  N
S
2 by 
 
                                        i(xi) ={(zi, zi)  SN: fi(xi, zi)  fi(zi, zi)}, for all xi  Si.                          
 
Then a set-valued mapping N: SN  N
S
2 is defined by 
 
                              N(x) ={(zi, zi)  SN: fi(xi, zi)  fi(zi, zi), for all i  N}, for x  SN.                    
 
That is, for every x  SN, 
 
                                    N(x) = iN i(xi) = iN{(zi, zi)  SN: fi(xi, zi)  fi(zi, zi)}.                        
 
 Using the notations for F(z, x) and F(x, x), it can be rewritten as 
 
                                                      N(x) = {z  SN: F(x, z) n f(z)}, for x  SN.                                           
 
It can be shown that the standard topology on Rn is natural with respect to the partial ordering n. 
That is, for every u  Rn, the following subsets of Rn  
 
                                                      {v  Rn: v n u} and {v  Rn: u n v} 
 
 5 
are all closed. The following lemma immediately follows from the above facts. 
 
Lemma 3. 1. Let G = (N, SN, f) be an n-person non-cooperative strategic game. Suppose that, for 
every i  N, Si is a nonempty closed and convex subset of a Banach space Bi and fi is a 
continuous real valued function defined on SN. Then, for any x  SN, N(x) is a closed subset of 
SN with respect to the product topology on SN.  
 
3. 2. Split Nash equilibrium Problems for two related noncooperative strategic games 
 
Let G(M, SM, g) be an m-person non-cooperative strategic game. Similar to the game (N, SN, f) 
considered in the previous sub-section, in the game G(M, SM, g), the player set is M with M = m, 
for some m > 1. For every player j  M, Sj is the strategy set and gj is his utility (payoff) function 
which is a real function defined on SM. We also write the set of profiles SM = jM Sj. The product 
utilities g = jM gj is a mapping from SM to Rm.  
 
We can similarly define a mapping G: SMSM  Rm by 
 
                                                   G(w, y) = jM gj(wj, yj), for y, w  SM.                              
 
Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person non-cooperative strategic games, 
respectively. Suppose that, for every i  N, Si is a nonempty closed and convex subset of a 
Banach space Bi and, for every j  M, Sj is a nonempty closed and convex subset of a Banach 
space Bj. We denote the product Banach spaces by 
 
                                                      BN = iN Bi   and BM = jM Bj. 
 
Throughout this section, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the strategy set of every player 
in a non-cooperative strategic game is a nonempty closed and convex subset of a Banach space. 
 
Let A  (BN, BM), that is, A: BN  BM is a linear continuous operator. Suppose that A has the 
component-wise linear continuous mappings Aj (BN, Bj), for j  M, such that 
 
                                        A(x) = jM Aj(x) = jM (Ax)j  BM, for x  BN.  
 
Then, similar to the notation in (1), for j  M, we can simply write  
 
                                        A(x) = (Aj(x), Aj(x)) = ((Ax)j, (Ax)j) = (Axj, Axj),                           (2) 
 
where Aj(x) = kM, k≠ j Ak(x)  Bj and Bj = kM, k≠ j Bk.                      
 
Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person non-cooperative strategic games, 
respectively. If there is a linear continuous operator A  (BN, BM) satisfying the following 
condition (3), then G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) are said to be related. 
 
                                                                      ASN  SM.                                                              (3) 
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Definition 3.2.  Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person related non-
cooperative strategic games, respectively, with a linear continuous operator A: BN  BM.  The 
split Nash equilibrium problem associated with the games G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), and the 
operator A, denoted by SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A), is formalized as: 
 
                                 find a Nash equilibrium x

of the game G(N, SN, f),                                   (4)  
such that                xA

is a Nash equilibrium of the game G(M, SM, g).                                   (5) 
 
That is, to find a profile x

 SN satisfying 
 
                                      fi(zi, ix

)  fi( ix

, ix

), for every i  N and for every zi  Si,                  (4) 
 
such that the profile xA

 SM  solves    
  
                            gj(yj, jxA 

)  gj( jxA

, jxA 

), for every j  M and for every yj  Sj.                 (5) 
 
Recall that, from the notation introduced in (2), for every j  M, we have 
 
                                      jxA

= jxA )(

= xAj

and jxA 

= jxA )(

= xA j

 . 
 
It can be equivalently written as: to find a profile x

 SN satisfying 
 
                                                      F(z, x

)  n f( x ), for all z  SN.                                               (4)    
  
such that the profile xA

 SM  solves 
  
                                               G(y, xA

)  gj( xA

),  for every y  SM.                                           (5) 
 
Such a profile x

in SN is called a split Nash equilibrium of this split Nash equilibrium problem 
SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A).  The set of all solutions to this split Nash equilibriums in this 
problem is denoted by  
 
                                                    (G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A)). 
 
When looking at the equilibrium problems (4) and (5) separately, the problem (4) is the classical 
Nash equilibriums problem of non-cooperative strategic games. When considering a special case 
of SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A) such as: N = M, SN = SM,  f = g (G(N, SN, f) = G(M, SM, g)) 
and A = I that is the identity mapping on SN, the split Nash equilibrium problem SNE(G(N, SN, f), 
G(M, SM, g), A) reduces to the classical Nash equilibrium problem for the game G(N, SN, f). In 
this view, split Nash equilibrium problems can be considered as the natural extensions of the 
classical Nash equilibrium problems. 
 
3.3. Convexity direction preserved linear operators  
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Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person non-cooperative strategic games with 
concave utility functions, respectively. A linear continuous operator A: BN  BM is said to be 
convexity direction preserved with respect to f and g on SN and SM if, for any given points (u, Au), 
(v, Av)  SNSM and for their arbitrary convex combination w = u + (1)v, where 0    1, we 
have either that 
 
                                           F(u, w) n f(w) and G(Au, Aw) m g(Aw) both hold 
 
or that 
 
                                           F(v, w) n f(w) and G(Av, Aw) m g(Aw) both hold. 
  
When understanding the concept of convexity direction preserved property, we can see that, for 
any given points u, v  SN and their convex combination of w = u + (1)v, we must have  
 
                                                     either F(u, w) n f(w), or F(v, w) n f(w).                              (6) 
 
 To see this, we assume by contradiction that 
 
                                                 F(u, w) >n f(w) and F(v, w) >n f(w) both hold. 
 
Then from the concavity of fi’s, we have 
 
                                                    f(w) = F(w, w)  
                                                           = F(u + (1)v, w + (1)w)  
                                                           n F(u, w) + (1)F(v, w)  
                                                           >n f(w) + (1) f(w)  
                                                           = f(w). 
   
This is a contradiction. Hence (6) must hold. Since A  (BN, BM), it follows that 
 
                                                               Aw = Au + (1)Av. 
 
Then we can similarly show that 
 
                                           either G(Au, Aw) m g(Aw)  or  G(Av, Aw) m g(Aw).                 (7) 
 
The convexity direction preserved property of A insures that one of the two inequalities in (6) 
and the corresponding inequality in (7) must simultaneously hold for the point u or the point v.  
 
3.4. An existence theorem 
 
Now we state and prove the main theorem in this section.  
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Theorem 3.3. Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person related non-cooperative 
strategic games, respectively, with a linear continuous operator A: BN  BM. Suppose that fi’s, 
gj’s, and A, satisfy the following conditions: 
 
          (a1).  fi’s and gj’s are all continuous and concave;   
          (a2). ASN = SM; 
          (a3). A is convexity vector direction preserved with respect to f and g on SN and SM. 
 
If there is a point (t, At)  SNSM such that 
 
                          {(z, Az)  SNSM: F(t, z) n f(z) and G(At, Az) m g(Az)} is compact, 
 
then SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A) has a solution. 
 
Proof.  For this operator A  (BN, BM) satisfying (a2) in this theorem, denote K its graph. K is a 
subset of SNSM  BNBM and is defined by 
 
                                                        K = {(x, Ax): x  SN}  SNSM.  
 
Since BN and BM are Banach spaces with the product topologies, by the closed graph theorem in 
Banach spaces, the graph of the bounded linear operator A from SN to SM is a closed subset of 
SNSM with respect to the product topology.  Then the convexity of SN and SM and the linearity of 
A imply that K is a nonempty closed and convex subset of SNSM  BNBM.  
 
On this underlying space K, we define a mapping T: K  2K\{} by 
 
               T(x, Ax) = {(z, Az)  K: F(x, z) n f(z) and G(Ax, Az) m g(Az)}, for (x, Ax)  K.          
 
From the continuity of the mappings A, f and g, and (7), we have (x, Ax)  T(x, Ax) which yields 
that, for every (x, Ax) K, T(x, Ax) is a nonempty closed subset of K  SNSM  BNBM.       
 
Next we show that T is a KKM mapping. For any points (u, Au), (v, Av)  K, we arbitrarily take a 
convex combination of w = u + (1)v, where 0 <  < 1. Since A  (BN, BM), it follows that 
 
                                                               Aw = Au + (1)Av. 
 
Then 
 
                                                       (w, Aw) = (u, Au) + (1)(v, Av) 
 
From condition (a2), A has the convexity direction preserved property with respect to f and g on 
SN and SM. Then, we have either 
 
                                                 F(u, w) n f(w) and G(Au, Aw) m g(Aw), 
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or 
 
                                                  F(v, w) n f(w) and G(Av, Aw) m g(Aw). 
 
That is, 
 
                                            either (w, Aw)  T(u, Au),  or  (w, Aw)  T(v, Av). 
 
It implies that 
 
                                                           (w, Aw)  T(u, Au)T(v, Av). 
 
Similarly, we can extend this to finite convex combinations. Hence, T is a KKM mapping. For 
the given point (t, At)  K from the assumptions of this theorem, we have 
 
                                      T(t, At) ={(z, Az)  K: F(t, z) n f(z) and G(At, Az) m g(Az)}. 
 
It is a nonempty compact subset of K  SNSM. 
 
By applying the Fan-KKM theorem, we obtain that (x, Ax)KT(x, Ax)  . Then, by taking any  
(x*, Ax*) (x, Ax)KT(x, Ax), we have 
 
                                                        F(x, x*) n f(x*),  for all x  SN,    (8) 
 
and 
 
                                                       G(Ax, Ax*) m g(Ax*),  for all x  SN.                              (9)   
 
Let y* = Ax*. Notice that, for the fixed point x*  SN and Ax* SM, the inclusion properties (8) and 
(9) can be considered separately. When we look at (9) for the fixed x*  SN, from condition (a2) 
of this theorem, (9) is equivalent to 
 
                                                       G(y, Ax*) m g(Ax*),  for all y  SM.                                 (10)   
 
Combining (8), (10), and y* = Ax*, we have (x*, y*) = (x*, Ax*) is a solution of the split Nash 
equilibrium problem SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A).             
 
A consequence of Theorem 3.3: 
 
Corollary 3.4. Let G(N, SN, f) and G(M, SM, g) be n-person and m-person non-cooperative 
strategic games, respectively, with the strategy sets all nonempty compact and convex subsets of 
Banach spaces. Let A: BN  BM be a linear continuous operator. Suppose that fi’s, gj’s and A 
satisfy the following conditions: 
 
          (a1).  fi’s and gj’s all are continuous and concave;   
          (a2). ASN = SM; 
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          (a3). A is convexity vector direction preserved with respect to f and g on SN and SM. 
 
Then SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A) has a solution. 
 
Remarks 3.5. The results in Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 do not mean that there does not exist 
a split Nash equilibrium if the conditions of these existence results do not hold. It only means 
that it cannot be assured that there is one. 
 
4. An example   
 
In this section we consider the Nash equilibrium problems for the utilities of industries in two 
related economic forests.  In view of game theory, it provides an example of split Nash 
equilibrium for noncooperative strategic games. 
 
Example 4.1. Suppose that there are two related economies, E1 and E2. In economy E1, there are 
three industries, a, b and c, which produce certain types of goods provided to the market that are 
defined by variables x, y, and z, respectively. Suppose that the quantities are nonnegative and the 
utilities (payoffs) are dependable. They are respectively defined by 
 
                                                  fa(x, y, z) = xyz  4x2;                                                                (11) 
 
                                                  fb(x, y, z) = x
2yz 
8
1
y4;                                                              (12) 
                                                  fc(x, y, z) = 2
1
x y 2
1
z  
2
1
z,   for 0  x, y, z < .                          (13) 
 
This economy formalizes a noncooperative strategic game, which has player set N = {a, b, c} 
with N = 3. For each player, the strategy set is R+ = [0, ). Hence the set of profiles SN =
3
R . 
The utility functions fa, fb, and fc, of the players are defined in (1113) with f = fafbfc. This 
game, which represents the economy E1, is denoted by G(N, SN, f).    
 
In economy E2, there are two industries, d and e, which also produce certain types of goods that 
are defined by variables s and t, respectively. Suppose that the quantities are also nonnegative 
and the utilities are also dependable and respectively defined by 
 
                                                        gd(s, t) =
2
1
st  
3
1
s2;                                                           (14)   
 
                                                     ge(s, t) = 48 2
1
s t 
48
1
t4,   for 0  s, t < .                             (15) 
 
This economy formalizes a noncooperative strategic game, which has player set M = {d, e} with 
M = 2. For each player, the strategy set is R+ = [0, ). Hence the set of profiles SM =
2
R . The 
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utility functions gd and ge of the players are defined in (1415) with g = gdge. This game, which 
represents the economyE2, is denoted by G(M, SM, g).    
 
Suppose that the two economies are related by their outcomes and the market demands in E2 are 
higher than that in E1. As in Section 3, the related relationship between the two economies E1 
and E2 is represented by the following operator A:
3
R   
2
R , 
 
                                                       (s, t)T = 





t
s
  = A










z
y
x
,  
 
where A is a positive linear and continuous operator from 3R  to 
2
R , which is defined by a 23 
positive matrix below 
 
                                                         A = 





212
121
 = 





e
d
A
A
, 
 
with Ad = (1 2 1) and Ae = (2 1 2) satisfying Ad, Ae ( 3R , R+). 
 
Is there a Nash equilibrium in E1 for the three industries with respect to the given utility 
functions defined in (1113)?  If so, is it possible that the outcomes in E2 transformed by the 
operator A from this Nash equilibrium in E1 constitute a Nash equilibrium in the economyE2? 
This question can be interpreted as the existence of solutions to the split Nash equilibrium 
problem SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A).   
  
Applying optimization theory in calculus, we can show that 
 
                                                fa(x, 2, 4)  fa(1, 2, 4), for all x  [0, ); 
 
                                                fb(1, y, 4)  fb(1, 2, 4), for all y  [0, ); 
 
                                                fc(1, 2, z)  fc(1, 2, 4), for all z  [0, ).  
  
It implies that the profile (1, 2, 4)  SN =
3
R  is a Nash equilibrium for the noncooperative 
strategic game G(N, SN, f). 
 
By the positive linear operator A, this Nash equilibrium (1, 2, 4) for G(N, SN, f) can be 
transformed to a profile (9, 12) in the game G(M, SM, g) as follows 
 
                                                 A(1, 2, 4) = 





212
121
(1, 2, 4) = 





12
9
. 
 
That is,  
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                                                      Ad(1, 2, 4)
T = (1 2 1)(1, 2, 4)T = 9, 
 
and                                              Ae(1, 2, 4)
T = (2 1 2)(1, 2, 4)T = 12. 
 
We can similarly prove that 
 
                                                  gd(s, 12)  gd(9, 12), for all s  [0, ); 
 
                                                    ge(9, t)  ge(9, 12), for all t  [0, ). 
 
It follows that the profile (9, 12) = (A(1, 2, 4))T is a Nash equilibrium for the noncooperative 
strategic game G(M, SM, g).  Hence (1, 2, 4) is a solution to the split Nash equilibrium problem 
SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A).  
 
5. Split Nash equilibrium for repeating (twice) noncooperative strategic games 
 
In game theory and in microeconomic theory, it is an important topic to study the behaviors of 
the equilibria when some games are repeated played. In particular, when a game is repeated, if 
the players select some new strategies which are created by linear transformations of the 
strategies in the previous action.  It can be treated as a special case of split Nash equilibrium 
problems for two related games. 
 
In a split Nash equilibrium problem SNE(G(N, SN, f), G(M, SM, g), A), if the game G(N, SN, f) is 
exactly the same as G(M, SM, g), then we say that the game G(N, SN, f) is repeated in this 
problem. In this case, the linear continuous operator A: SN  SM can be considered a modification 
of the strategies when this game is repeated. The split equilibrium problem SNE(G(N, SN, f), 
G(N, SN, f), A) is called a split Nash equilibrium problem for repeated game, simply denoted by 
SNE(G(N, SN, f)
2, A). 
 
Let G(N, SN, f) be a n-person non-cooperative strategic game with concave utility function. A 
linear continuous operator A: BN  BN is said to be convexity direction preserved with respect to f 
on SN if, for any given points (u, Au), (v, Av)  SNSN and for their arbitrary convex combination 
w = u + (1)v, where 0    1, we have either that 
 
                                           F(u, w) n f(w) and F(Au, Aw) n f(Aw) both hold, 
 
or that 
 
                                           F(v, w) n f(w) and F(Av, Aw) n f(Aw) both hold. 
 
From Theorem 3. 3, we have 
 
Corollary 5.1. Let G(N, SN, f) be a n-person non-cooperative strategic game. Let A: BN  BN be a 
linear continuous operator. Suppose that fi’s and A satisfy the following conditions: 
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          (a1).  fi’s all are continuous and concave;   
          (a2). ASN = SN; 
          (a3). A is convexity vector direction preserved with respect to f on SN. 
 
If there is (t, At)  SNSN such that 
 
                           {(z, Az)  SNSN: F(t, z) n f(z) and F(At, Az) n f(Az)} is compact, 
 
then SNE(G(N, SN, f)
2, A) has a solution. 
 
Next we consider split Nash equilibrium problems for repeated game SNE(G(N, SN, f)
2, A), in 
which A: BN  BN is defined by a transition matrix, such as, 
 
                                                   A = 














nnnn
n
n



...
............
...
...
21
22221
11211
,                                                     (16) 
 
where ij  0, for all i, j = 1, 2, …, n  and 

n
j
ij
1
 = 1, for all i = 1, 2, …, n.    
In a split Nash equilibrium problem for repeated game SNE(G(N, SN, f)
2, A), if the linear operator 
A is defined by a transition matrix such as (16), then it is called a split Nash equilibrium problem 
of Markov type, or simply called a Markov split Nash equilibrium problem. As an example of 
Markov split Nash equilibrium problem, we study the extended Bertrant model of price 
competition. 
  
6. Applications to the dual extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition 
 
The Bertrant duopoly model of price competition (denoted by BM) is a model of oligopolistic 
competition that deals with two profit-maximizing firms, named by 1 and 2, in a market (see 
[9]). In this model, it is assumed that the two firms have constant returns to scale technologies 
with the same cost c, per unit produced. It means that the products by the two firms have the 
same quality.    
 
In this section, we generalize the Bertrant duopoly model to the extended Bertrant model of price 
competition (denoted by EBM). Suppose that the qualities of the productions produced by the 
two firms possibly be different. The two firms have constant returns to scale technologies with 
costs c1 > 0 and c2 > 0, per unit produced, respectively. In the extended Bertrant Model, c1 may 
be different from c2, that explains that the qualities of the productions by these two firms may be 
different. In the extended Bertrant model, without loss of the generality, we assume  
 
                                                                       c1  c2,                                                                  (17) 
 
The inequality (17) means that the quality of the products in firm 1 may not be as good as that  
produced in firm 2.  
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Let pj be the price of the products by firm j, for j = 1, 2.  Let (p1, p2) be the demand function in 
this duopoly market. Let j(p1, p2) be the sale function for firm j, for j = 1, 2. f and j are assumed 
to be continuous functions of two variables and strictly decreasing with respect to every given 
variable. Suppose that there are positive numbers 
jp , for j = 1, 2, such that, for all pk 
 
                           j(pj, pk)  0, for all pj  [0, jp )  and   j(pj, pk) = 0, for all pj  jp  
 
Suppose that the socially optimal (competitive) output level in this market is strictly positive and 
finite for every firm  
                                                                    0 < (c1, c2) < . 
 
For given prices p1, p2, for firms 1 and 2, respectively, the market is assumed to be clear. That is,  
   
                                                         (p1, p2) = 1(p1, p2) + 2(p1, p2). 
 
Let  = ,/ 21 cc that defines the ratio of the qualities of the products by firm 1 to firm 2. From the 
assumption (17), we have   (0, 1]. Considered as a noncooperative strategic game, the 
competition takes place as follows: The two firms simultaneously name their prices p1, p2, 
respectively. The sales 1(p1, p2) and 2(p1, p2) are then satisfied  
 
                                                   
),(
),(
21
211
pp
pp


 = 










,if,1
if,
if,0
21
21
21
1
21
pp
pp
cc
c
pp



                                          (18) 
 
and  
                                                  
),(
),(
21
212
pp
pp


 = 










.if,0
if,
if,1
21
21
21
2
21
pp
pp
cc
c
pp



                                          (19)                          
 
We assume that the firms produce to order and so they incur production costs only for an output 
level equal to their actual sales. Therefore, for given prices p1, p2, the firm j has profits 
 
                                                  uj(p1, p2) = (pj  cj)j(p1, p2), for j = 1, 2.                                  (20) 
    
Theorem 6.1. In the extended Bertrant duopoly Model, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
)ˆ,ˆ( 21 pp  = (c1, c2). In this equilibrium, both firms set their prices equal to their costs, 
respectively: 1pˆ = c1, 2pˆ = c2. 
 
Proof. In the proof of this theorem, we always assume that the firms realistically name their 
prices pj  [0, jp ), for j = 1, 2. It implies (p1, p2) > 0, for all prices p1, p2 realistically set by 
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firms 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
At first we show that (c1, c2) is a Nash equilibrium in the extended Bertrant duopoly Model. 
From (20), if both firms set their prices equal to their costs, respectively, then both firms earn 
zero profits, that is, 
 
                                               uj(c1, c2) = (cj  cj)j(c1, c2) = 0, for j = 1, 2.                               (21) 
 
As firm 2 sets its price c2, for any price p1 named by firm 1, it earns profits 
 
                                                           u1(p1, c2) = (p1  c1)f1(p1, c2).                                          (22) 
 
Noting c2 = c1, from (18), we have 
 
                                                       
),(
),(
21
211
cp
cp


 = 










.if,1
if,
if,0
11
11
21
1
11
cp
cp
cc
c
cp
                                          
 
By (22), it implies 
 
                                                          u1(p1, c2) = 





.if,0
if,0
11
11
cp
cp
                                              
 
Hence  
 
                                      u1(p1, c2)  u1(c1, c2),  for all price p1 named by firm 1.                       (23) 
 
As firm 1 sets its price c1, for any price p2 named by firm 2, it earns profits 
 
                                                           u2(c1, p2) = (p2  c2)2(c1, p2).                                          (24) 
 
Since 

1
c1 = c2, from (19), we have 
 
                                                        
),(
),(
21
212
pc
pc


 = 










.if,0
if,
if,1
22
22
21
2
22
cp
cp
cc
c
cp
                                          
 
From (24), it implies 
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                                                          u2(c1, p2) = 





.if,0
if,0
22
22
cp
cp
                                              
 
Hence  
 
                                         u2(c1, p2)  u2(c1, c2),  for all price p2 named by firm 2.                   (25) 
 
Combining (23) and (25), it concludes that (c1, c2) is a Nash equilibrium in the extended Bertrant 
duopoly Model.  
 
Next we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Assume that (d1, d2) is also a Nash 
equilibrium in the extended Bertrant duopoly Model. At the given prices (d1, d2), the earns of the 
two firms respectively are  
 
                                                    u1(d1, d2) = (d1  c1)1(d1, d2),                                                (26) 
 
                                                    u2(d1, d2) = (d2  c2)2(d1, d2).                                                (27) 
 
Where the sale functions 1(d1, d2) and 2(d1, d2) satisfy the following equations 
 
                                                     
),(
),(
21
211
dd
dd


 = 










,if,1
if,
 if,0
21
21
21
1
21
dd
dd
cc
c
dd



                                     (28)                                       
  
                                                     
),(
),(
21
212
dd
dd


 = 










.if,0
if,
 if,1
21
21
21
2
21
dd
dd
cc
c
dd



                                    (29) 
 
At first, we show d1 = c1. The proof is divided into two cases. 
 
Case 1: Assume d1 < c1. Case 1 is also divided into two subcases with respect to d1 and d2. 
 
Subcase 1.1: d1 > d2. In this case, we must have d2 < c2. Otherwise, c1 > d1 > d2  c2 = c1. A 
contradiction.  Then from (27) and (29), we have  
 
                                               u2(d1, d2) = (d2  c2)2(d1, d2) < 0, if d1 > d2.                                            
 
For any price p2 set by firm 2 satisfying d1 < p2, from (29), we have 2(d1, p2) = 0. It implies 
 
                                               u2(d1, p2) = (p2  c2)2(d1, p2) = 0,  if d1 < p2.                                 
 
It implies 
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                                                u2(d1, d2) < u2(d1, p2), for all p2 with d1 < p2.                            (30)   
 
Subcase 1.2: d1  d2.  In this subcase, 1(d1, d2) > 0. From d1 < c1, it implies  
 
                                                                        u1(d1, d2) < 0.                                                        
 
For any price p1 set by firm 1 satisfying p1 > d2, from (28), we have 1(p1, d2) = 0. It implies 
 
                                                        u1(p1, d2) = (p1  c1)1(p1, d2) = 0.                                           
 
It follows that 
 
                                               u1(d1, d2) < u1(p1, d2), for all p1 with p1 > d2.                             (31) 
 
By (30) and (31), it implies that if d1 < c1, then (d1, d2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Case 2: Assume d1 > c1. Case 2 is divided into five subcases with respect to d1 and d2. 
 
Subcase 2.1: d1 > d2 > c1.  In this subcase, 1(d1, d2) = 0. It implies u1(d1, d2) = 0. For any price 
p1 named by firm 1 satisfying c1 < p1  d2, from (28), we have 1(p1, d2) > 0 and 
 
                                                        u1(p1, d2) = (p1  c1)1(p1, d2) > 0.                                           
 
It implies 
 
                                               u1(d1, d2) < u1(p1, d2), for all p1 with c1 < p1  d2.                     (32) 
 
Subcase 2.2: d1 > c1 > d2. Since c2 = c1, it implies d2 < c2. In this case, from (29), we have 
 
                                                        u2(d1, d2) < 0 and  u2(d1, c2) = 0.                                        (33)                                                               
 
Subcase 2.3: d1 > d2 = c1. Since c2 = c1, it implies d2 = c2. If firm 2 names a price p2 satisfying 
d1 > p2 > c1, then, p2 > c1 = d2 = c2. It implies p2 > c2. From (27) and (29), we have  
 
                                                       u2(d1, d2) = 0  and  u2(d1, p2) > 0.                                         (34)                                                               
 
Subcase 2.4: d1 = d2.  In this case, we must have d2 > c2. Otherwise, c1 < d1 = d2  c2 = c1. A 
contradiction. Then from (27) and (29), we have  
 
                                                     u2(d1, d2) = (d2  c2) 
21
2
cc
c

(d1, d2).                                    (35) 
 
We take an arbitrary small number  > 0. Since d1 > (d2  ), from (27) and (29), we have  
 
                                                    u2(d1, d2  ) = (d2    c2)(d1, d2 ).                                (36) 
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Noting 0 < 
21
2
cc
c

< 1, and, for fixed d1, (d1, d2) is continuous and strictly decreasing with 
respect to d2, we can choose  to be positive and small enough, such that d2   > c2 and 
 
                                            (d2  c2) 
21
2
cc
c

(d1, d2) < (d2    c2)(d1, d2  ). 
 
By (35) and (36), it implies 
 
                        u2(d1, d2) < u2(d1, d2  ), for all  to be small enough satisfying d2   > c2.   (37)                                    
  
Subcase 2.5: d1 < d2. Then from (27) and (29), we have u2(d1, d2) = 0. Take p2 satisfying d1 = 
p2. Similar to subcase 2.4, we must have p2 > c2. It implies  
 
                                                 u2(d1, p2) = (p2  c2) 
21
2
cc
c

(d1, p2) > 0.                                   
 
We have 
 
                                              u2(d1, d2) < u2(d1, p2), for all p2 satisfying d1 = p2.                    (38) 
 
Combining (3234), (3738), it implies that if d1 > c1, then (d1, d2) is not a Nash equilibrium. By 
summarizing cases 1 and 2, we must have d1 = c1.  
 
Now we assume d1 = c1 and then show d2 = c2. The proof is divided into case I and case II. 
 
Case I: Assume d2 < c2. Case I is also divided into two subcases with respect to c1 and d2. 
 
Subcase I.1: c1  d2. Then from (27) and (29), we have u2(c1, d2) = (d2  c2)2(c1, d2) < 0.                                       
For any price p2 set by firm 2 satisfying c1 < p2, from (29), we have 2(c1, p2) = 0. It implies 
 
                                               u2(c1, p2) = (p2  c2)2(c1, p2) = 0, if c1 < p2.                              
 
We get 
                                               u2(c1, d2) < u2(c1, p2), for all p2 with c1 < p2.                         (39) 
 
Subcase I. 2: c1 < d2. In this subcase, 1(c1, d2) > 0 and u1(c1, d2) = 0. For any price p1 set by 
firm 1 satisfying c1 < p1 < d2, from (28), we have 1(p1, d2) > 0. It implies 
 
                                                       u1(p1, d2) = (p1  c1)1(p1, d2) > 0.                                          
 
Then 
                                               u1(c1, d2) < u1(p1, d2), for all p1 with c1 < p1 < d2.                  (40) 
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By (39) and (40), if d2 < c2, then (c1, d2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Case II: Assume d2 > c2. In this case, d2 > c1 and u1(c1, d2) = 0. For any price p1 set by firm 1 
satisfying c1 < p1 < d2, from (28), we have 1(p1, d2) > 0. Then 
 
                                                        u1(p1, d2) = (p1  c1)1(p1, d2) > 0.                                          
 
It implies that if d2 > c2, then (c1, d2) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. By summarizing cases I and 
II, we conclude that d2 = c2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
It is well-known that the realistic model about producing-sale competition of some firms should 
be a dynamic model instead of static. In this paper, we consider the dual extended Bertrant 
duopoly model of price competition that is a repeating (twice) game of the static extended 
Bertrant studied in Theorem 6.1. In the dual extended Bertrant model, a firm always consider the 
reaction of its competitor to its price or quantity. For example, firm 1 could try to increase its 
profits by increasing the price from p1 to 1p (never excess p2), even though decreasing its sales 1(
1p , p2) Meanwhile, firm 2 could try to increase its profits by decreasing the price from p2 to 2p
(never lower than p1) and increasing its sales 2(p1, 2p ). Such performance can be considered as a 
linear transformation from (p1, p2) to ( 1p , 2p ): there is a 22 matrix A                                                                              
 
                                                                A = 









1
1
,                                                    (41) 
 
where 0  ,   1 such that ( 1p , 2p ) = A(p1, p2).                                                      
 
We consider if there is a Nash equilibrium )ˆ,ˆ( 21 pp  in the static extended Bertrant model of price 
competition such that the transformed (modified) prices A )ˆ,ˆ( 21 pp  is also a Nash equilibrium in 
the extended Bertrant model. As a matter of fact, it is a Markov split Nash equilibrium problem 
for dual extended Bertrant model considered as repeating (twice) games. It is written as 
SNE(EBM2, A), that is studied in the previous section. By Theorem 6.1, (c1, c2) is the unique 
Nash equilibrium in the extended Bertrant duopoly Model of price competition. As a 
consequence of Theorem 6.1, we have  
 
Theorem 6.2. For the Markov split Nash equilibrium problem of the dual extended Bertrant 
duopoly Model of price competition SNE(EBM2, A), we have 
 
(i) If c1 = c2 = c, then, for any linear transformation A defined in (41), (c, c) is the unique 
Markov split Nash equilibrium in SNE(EBM2, A);  
 
(ii) If c1 < c2, then there exists a unique Markov split Nash equilibrium in SNE(EBM2, A), 
(c1, c2), only if the linear transformation A is the identity    
 
                                                  A = 





10
01
. 
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